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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the transmitter optimiza-
tion problem in slow fading multiple-input-single-output (MISO)
wiretap channel. The source transmits a secret message intended
for K users in the presence of J non-colluding eavesdroppers, and
operates under a total power constraint. The channels between
the source and all users and eavesdroppers are assumed to be
slow fading, and only statistical channel state information (CSI)
is known at the source. For a given code rate and secrecy rate
pair of the wiretap code, denoted by (RD, Rs), we define the non-
outage event as the joint event of the link information rates to K
users be greater than or equal to RD and the link information
rates to J eavesdroppers be less than or equal to (RD − Rs).
We minimize the transmit power subject to the total power
constraint and satisfying the probability of the non-outage event
to be greater than or equal to a desired threshold (1− ǫ).
keywords: Physical layer security, MISO wiretap channel, secrecy rate,
multiple eavesdroppers, slow fading.
I. INTRODUCTION
With growing applications on wireless networks, there is
a need to provide security, along with reliability, from being
eavesdropped, which can easily happen due to the broadcast
nature of the wireless transmission. Wyner, in his work in
[1], showed that a message could be transmitted at a rate
called secrecy rate, at which the legitimate user could decode
the message reliably whereas the eavesdropper could be kept
entirely ignorant. The wiretap channel model in [1] was
physically degraded and discrete memoryless. Later, the work
in [1] was extended to more general broadcast channel and
Gaussian channel in [2] and [3], respectively. Subsequent
extension to various multi-antenna wireless wiretap channels
and the corresponding achievable secrecy rates and secrecy
capacities have been reported by many authors, e.g., [4]–[11].
In [12], secrecy capacity of a quasi-static single-antenna
Rayleigh fading channel in terms of outage probability has
been characterized. Outage probability characterization of the
secrecy rate of multiple-input-single-output (MISO) wiretap
channel with artificial noise has been reported in [13]–[15],
and that of amplify-and-forward relay channel has been re-
ported in [16]. Motivated by the need for outage probability
characterization of secrecy rate in MISO wiretap channel, in
this paper, we consider the transmitter optimization problem
in slow fading MISO wiretap channel. The source transmits
a secret message intended for K users in the presence of J
non-colluding eavesdroppers, and operates under a total power
constraint. The channels between the source and all users and
eavesdroppers are assumed to be slow fading. Only statistical
channel state information (CSI) is assumed to be known at
the source. For a given code rate and secrecy rate pair of the
wiretap code, denoted by (RD, Rs), we define the non-outage
event as the joint event of the link information rates to K
users be greater than or equal to RD and the link information
rates to J eavesdroppers be less than or equal to (RD −Rs).
We minimize the transmit power subject to the total power
constraint and satisfying the probability of the non-outage
event to be greater than or equal to a desired threshold (1−ǫ).
We obtain the achievable (RD, Rs) region and the transmit
beamforming vector. We note that we differ from the reported
works in [13,14], which also consider multiple eavesdroppers
scenario, in following aspects: i) number of users K can be
more than one, ii) only statistical CSI of the users channels are
known, and iii) channel covariance matrices of all users and
eavesdroppers can be arbitrary positive semidefinite matrices.
Notations : A ∈ CN1×N2 implies that A is a complex
matrix of dimension N1 ×N2. A  0 and A ≻ 0 imply that
A is a positive semidefinite matrix and positive definite matrix,
respectively. Identity matrix is denoted by I . Transpose and
complex conjugate transpose operations are denoted by [.]T
and [.]∗, respectively. E[.] denotes the expectation operator,
and ‖ . ‖ denotes the 2-norm operator. diag(a) denotes a
diagonal matrix with elements of the vector a ∈ CN×1 on
its diagonal. Trace of matrix A ∈ CN×N is denoted by
Tr(A). h ∈ CN×1 ∼ CN (0,H ) implies that h is a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random vector with mean vector
0 and covariance matrix H .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a MISO wiretap channel as shown in Fig. 1,
which consists of a source S having N transmit antennas, K
users {D1, D2, · · · , DK} each having single antenna, and J
non-colluding eavesdroppers {E1, E2, · · · , EJ} each having
single antenna. The complex channel gain vector from S to
Dk is denoted by hk ∈ C1×N , 1 ≤ k ≤ K . Likewise,
the complex channel gain vector from S to Ej is denoted
by zj ∈ C1×N , 1 ≤ j ≤ J . We assume that the channels
between S to Dks and those between S to Ejs fade slowly and
independently with hk ∼ CN (0,Hk), and zj ∼ CN (0,Zj).
These channel gains are assumed to be unknown at S. We
assume that the source S operates under total power constraint
PT . The communication between S and Dks happens in n
channel uses. The source S transmits secret message W which
is equiprobable over {1, 2, · · · , 2nRs}. For each W drawn
equiprobably from the set {1, 2, · · · , 2nRs}, the source, using
a stochastic encoder, maps W to a codeword {xi}ni=1 of length
n, where each xi ∈ C, i.i.d. ∼ CN (0, 1), and E[|xi|2] = 1.
Each codeword {xi}ni=1 belongs to a collection of 2nRD
zj
j = 1, 2, · · · , J
Ej
S
1 2 N
w
hk
Dk
k = 1, 2, · · · , K
Fig. 1. System model for MISO wiretap channel with K users and J
eavesdroppers.
codewords (i.e., wiretap code) where RD ≥ Rs. The source
applies the complex weight w = [w1, w2, · · · , wN ]T ∈ CN×1
and transmits the weighted symbol which is wxi in the ith
channel use, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since the source is power constrained,
this implies that
‖w‖2 ≤ PT . (1)
In the following, we will use x to denote the symbols in the
codeword {xi}ni=1. Since the channel is slow fading and the
CSI is unknown at the source S, we define the non-outage
event for a given (RD, Rs) pair of the wiretap code, denoted
by E , and impose the probability constraint on E as follows:
E =
{
RDk ≥ RD, ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, and
RD −Rs ≥ REj , ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J
}
, (2)
Pr(E) ≥ (1− ǫ), (3)
where (1 − ǫ) is the non-outage probability threshold, and
RDk and REj are the link information rates between S to Dk
and S to Ej , respectively. In other words, when the source
selects the target code rate and target secrecy rate pair of the
wiretap code as (RD, Rs), the above constraint implies that,
with probability greater than or equal to (1− ǫ), all Dks will
be able to successfully decode the transmitted message while
all Ejs will be ignorant about the transmitted message. We
also note that when the CSI on all the links are known at
S, the achievability of the secrecy rate Rs is shown in [11].
Let yDk and yEj denote the received signals at Dk and Ej ,
respectively. We have
yDk = hkwx+ ηDk , ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, (4)
yEj = zjwx+ ηEj , ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, (5)
where ηs are noise components, assumed to be i.i.d. ∼
CN (0, N0).
III. TRANSMITTER OPTIMIZATION UNDER SECRECY
CONSTRAINT
Using (4) and (5), and for a given hk and zj , the informa-
tion rates at Dk and Ej are obtained, respectively, as follows:
RDk = I(x; yDk) = log2
(
1 +
|hkw|2
N0
)
, (6)
REj = I(x; yEj ) = log2
(
1 +
|zjw|2
N0
)
. (7)
Further, subject to the constraints in (1) and (3) and using (6)
and (7), the optimization problem to minimize the transmit
power is as follows:
min
w
‖w‖2 (8)
s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ PT , (9)
Pr
{
log2
(
1 +
|hkw|2
N0
)
≥ RD, ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K,
RD − Rs ≥ log2
(
1 +
|zjw|2
N0
)
, ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J
}
≥ (1− ǫ). (10)
Since hks and zjs are independent, we rewrite the constraint
(10) in the following equivalent product form:
K∏
k=1
Pr
{
|hkw|2 ≥
(
2RD − 1)N0
}
J∏
j=1
Pr
{
|zjw|2 ≤
(
2
(
RD−Rs
)
− 1)N0
}
≥ (1− ǫ). (11)
We note that solving the optimization problem (8) in its
original form is hard. So, in order to simplify the analysis,
we replace the product probability constraint in (11) with the
following K + J individual probability constraints:
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, and ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
Pr
{
|hkw|2 ≥
(
2RD − 1)N0
}
≥ (1 − ǫ) 1K+J , (12)
Pr
{
|zjw|2 ≤
(
2
(
RD−Rs
)
− 1)N0
}
≥ (1− ǫ) 1K+J . (13)
We also note that any w which satisfies all K+J constraints
in (12) and (13) will also satisfy the product probability con-
straint in (11). However, the converse may not always be true.
Further, since hkw in (12) and zjw in (13) are linear trans-
formations of circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
vectors, hkw and zjw are also circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian random variables, i.e., hkw ∼ CN
(
0, w∗Hkw
)
,
and zjw ∼ CN
(
0, w∗Zjw
)
. This further implies that
|hkw|2 and |zjw|2 are exponential random variables, i.e.,
|hkw|2 ∼ 1
w∗Hkw
exp
− λ
w∗Hkw , λ ≥ 0, (14)
|zjw|2 ∼ 1
w∗Zjw
exp
− λ
w∗Zjw , λ ≥ 0. (15)
Using (14) and (15), and by following standard integration
steps, we get the following equivalent simplified inequalities
for the probability constraints in (12) and (13):
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, w∗Hkw ≥ a, (16)
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, w∗Zjw ≤ b, (17)
where a = (2
RD−1)N0
− ln(1−ǫ)
1
(K+J)
and b = (2
(RD−Rs)−1)N0
− ln(1−(1−ǫ)
1
(K+J) )
.
Replacing the constraint in (11) with (16) and (17), we get
the following upper bound for the optimization problem (8):
min
w
‖w‖2 (18)
s.t. ‖w‖2 ≤ PT , (19)
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, w∗Hkw ≥ a, (20)
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, w∗Zjw ≤ b, (21)
We solve the above problem for the following two cases.
A. All Hks and Zjs are diagonal matrices
When all Hks and Zjs are diagonal positive semidefinite
matrices, the optimization problem (18) can be written as the
following equivalent linear optimization problem:
min
P1,P2,··· ,PN
N∑
m=1
Pm (22)
s.t. ∀m = 1, 2, · · · , N, Pm ≥ 0,
N∑
m=1
Pm ≤ PT , (23)
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K,
N∑
m=1
PmH
mm
k ≥ a, (24)
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J,
N∑
m=1
PmZ
mm
j ≤ b, (25)
where Pm = |wm|2, Hk = diag ([H11k , H22k , · · · , HNNk ]T ) 
0, and Zj = diag ([Z11j , Z22j , · · · , ZNNj ]T )  0. The above
problem can be easily solved using linear optimization tech-
niques. Having obtained P1, P2, · · · , PN , the beamforming
vector w is [
√
P1,
√
P2, · · · ,
√
PN ]
T
.
B. Some of Hks or Zjs are not diagonal matrices
Here, we consider the general case when Hks and Zjs are
Hermitian positive semidefinite matrices and some of Hks or
Zjs are not diagonal. Define W
△
= ww∗. We rewrite the
optimization problem (18) into the following equivalent form:
min
W
Tr (W ) (26)
s.t. W  0, rank(W ) = 1, Tr (W ) ≤ PT , (27)
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, Tr (WHk) ≥ a, (28)
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, Tr (WZj) ≤ b. (29)
The above optimization problem is a non-convex optimization
problem. However, by relaxing the rank(W ) = 1 constraint,
the above problem can be solved using semidefinite program-
ming techniques [17]. But the solution W of the above rank
relaxed optimization problem may not have rank 1. This can
be easily seen from the KKT conditions of the rank relaxed
optimization problem which we discuss in the Appendix. We
now take the rank-1 approximation as follows. Let w0 be the
unit-norm eigen direction corresponding to the largest eigen
value of W . We substitute W = Pw0w∗0 in the above rank
relaxed optimization problem and solve the resulting linear
optimization problem for unknown P , i.e.,
min
P
P (30)
s.t. 0 ≤ P ≤ PT , (31)
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, Pw∗0Hkw0 ≥ a, (32)
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, Pw∗0Zjw0 ≤ b. (33)
Having obtained the transmit power P from (30), the
beamforming vector is
√
Pw0.
Remark 1: We note that when the channel CSI hk on all
Dks are perfectly known at the source S, the constraints (28)
and (29) in the optimization problem (26) should be replaced
with the following constraints, respectively:
Tr (Wh∗khk) ≥ (2RD − 1)N0, (34)
Tr (WZj) ≤ (2
(RD−Rs) − 1)N0
− ln(1 − (1− ǫ) 1J ) . (35)
Remark 2: When the source transmits the symbol x
from an equiprobable complex finite alphabet set A =
{a1, a2, · · · , aM} of size M (e.g., M -ary) with E[x] = 0 and
E[|x|2] = 1, the information rates in (6) and (7) can be written
in the following forms, respectively:
RDk = I(x; yDk) = I
( |hkw|2
N0
)
, (36)
REj = I(x; yEj ) = I
( |zjw|2
N0
)
, (37)
where
I(ρ)
△
=
1
M
M∑
l=1
∫
pn
(
y −√ρal
)
log2
pn(y −√ρal)
1
M
M∑
m=1
pn(y −√ρam)
dy, (38)
and pn(θ) = 1π e
−|θ|2
. Using the fact that the mutual informa-
tion function, I(ρ), is a strictly-increasing concave function in
ρ [18,19], K + J constraints in (20) and (21) can be written
in the following forms, respectively:
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, w∗Hkw ≥ a, (39)
∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, w∗Zjw ≤ b, (40)
where a = I
−1(RD)N0
− ln(1−ǫ)
1
(K+J)
and b = I
−1(RD−Rs)N0
− ln(1−(1−ǫ)
1
(K+J) )
. With
finite alphabet input, the optimization problem (18) should be
solved subject to the constraints in (39) and (40).
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We have evaluated the secrecy rate through simulation with
the following system parameters: N = 3, K = 2, J =
1, 2, 3, N0 = 1, ǫ = 0.1, and PT = 12 dB. We consider
the scenarios discussed in Section III-A and Section III-B.
Scenario of Section III-B: We have used the following pos-
itive definite channel covariance matrices in the simulations:
H1 =


2.1670, 0.1806 + 0.0183i, −0.1453 − 0.3101i
0.1806 − 0.0183i, 1.9165, 0.0696 + 0.3374i
−0.1453 + 0.3101i, 0.0696 − 0.3374i, 1.4180

 ≻ 0 (41)
H2 =


1.9834, −0.2001 + 0.0250i, 0.0470 − 0.3424i
−0.2001 − 0.0250i, 1.3867, 0.0149 − 0.2083i
0.0470 + 0.3424i, 0.0149 + 0.2083i, 1.4323

 ≻ 0 (42)
Z1 =


0.0043, 0.0010 − 0.0003i, 0.0013 + 0.0009i
0.0010 + 0.0003i, 0.0074, −0.0011 − 0.0029i
0.0013 − 0.0009i, −0.0011 + 0.0029i, 0.0079

 ≻ 0 (43)
Z2 =


0.0069, 0.0004 − 0.0029i, −0.0014 + 0.0014i
0.0004 + 0.0029i, 0.0070, −0.0019− 0.0002i
−0.0014 − 0.0014i, −0.0019 + 0.0002i, 0.0086

 ≻ 0 (44)
Z3 =


0.0090, −0.0026 + 0.0006i, 0.0011 − 0.0009i
−0.0026 − 0.0006i, 0.0064, −0.0013 + 0.0018i
0.0011 + 0.0009i, −0.0013− 0.0018i, 0.0054

 ≻ 0 (45)
For a given (RD, Rs) pair, we solve the semidefinite rank
relaxed optimization problem (26) using the tools in [20,21].
We numerically observe that, for any feasible (RD, Rs) pair,
the solution W of the rank relaxed optimization problem (26)
has rank 1. This implies that for such channel realizations,
rank-1 approximation is not needed. In Fig 2(a), we plot
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Fig. 2. Rs vs RD and Transmit Power vs RD in MISO wiretap channel
with N = 3, K = 2, J = 1, 2, 3, N0 = 1, ǫ = 0.1 and PT = 12 dB,
and non-diagonal covariance matrices.
the maximum achievable Rs vs RD . In Fig 2(b), we plot
the corresponding mimimum transmit power vs RD . We
observe that the maximum achievable secrecy rate Rs and
the corresponding minimum transmit power increases with
increase in RD . The secrecy rate drops to zero when the entire
available power, PT = 12 dB, is used.
Scenario of Section III-A: Here, we take H1, H2, Z1, Z2,
and Z3 as the diagonal approximation of covariance matrices
in (41), (42), (43), (44), and (45), respectively. We solve the
linear optimization problem (22) using the tools in [20,21],
and we plot the maximum achievable Rs vs RD and the
corresponding mimimum transmit power vs RD in Fig 3(a)
and Fig 3(b), respectively. As in Fig 2(a) and Fig 2(b), we
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Fig. 3. Rs vs RD and Transmit Power vs RD in MISO wiretap channel
with N = 3, K = 2, J = 1, 2, 3, N0 = 1, ǫ = 0.1 and PT = 12 dB,
and diagonal covariance matrices.
observe that the maximum achievable secrecy rate Rs and
the corresponding minimum transmit power increases with
increase in RD . The secrecy rate drops to zero when the entire
available power, PT = 12 dB, is used.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the transmitter optimization problem in slow
fading MISO wiretap channel. Secret message transmitted by
the source was intended for K users in the presence of J
eavesdroppers. For a given code rate and secrecy rate pair
of the wiretap code, denoted by (RD, Rs), we defined the
non-outage event and minimized the transmit power subject
to the total power constraint and satisfying the probability of
the non-outage event to be greater than a desired threshold
(1− ǫ). We obtained the achievable (RD, Rs) region and the
transmit beamforming vector.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we analyze the rank of the optimal solution
W of the rank relaxed optimization problem (26). We take the
Lagrangian [17] of the rank relaxed optimization problem (26)
as follows:
ℓ
(
W , Λ, λ, µk, νj
)
= Tr (W )− Tr (ΛW )
+ λ
(
Tr (W )− PT
)
+
K∑
k=1
µk
(
a− Tr (WHk)
)
+
J∑
j=1
νj
(
Tr (WZj)− b
)
, (46)
where Λ  0, λ ≥ 0, µk ≥ 0, and νj ≥ 0 are Lagrangian
multipliers. The KKT conditions are as follows:
K1. All the constraints in (27), (28), and (29) excluding the
constraint rank(W ) = 1,
K2. Tr (ΛW ) = 0. Since Λ  0 and W  0, this implies
that ΛW = 0,
K3. λ
(
Tr (W )− PT
)
= 0,
K4. ∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, µk
(
a− Tr (WHk)
)
= 0,
K5. ∀j = 1, 2, · · · , J, νj
(
Tr (WZj)− b
)
= 0,
K6. ∂ℓ
∂W
= 0 implies that Λ = (1 + λ)I −∑Kk=1 µkHk +∑J
j=1 νjZj  0,
The KKT conditions (K2), (K6), (K4), and (K5) imply that
(1 + λ)Tr (W ) −∑Kk=1 µka +∑Jj=1 νjb = 0. For W 6= 0,
this further implies that not all µks can be zero simultaneously.
With this, we rewrite (K6) in the following form:
Λ+
K∑
k=1
µkHk = (1 + λ)I +
J∑
j=1
νjZj ≻ 0. (47)
The above equation implies that rank(Λ +∑K
k=1 µkHk) = N . This further implies that
rank(Λ) ≥ N − rank(∑Kk=1 µkHk). (K2) implies
that rank(W ) ≤ rank(∑Kk=1 µkHk) (assuming W 6= 0).
This means that the rank of W may not be one.
For the special case when K = 1 and H1 is a rank one
positive semidefinite matrix, (47) implies that rank(Λ) ≥ N−
1. Assuming W 6= 0, (K2) further implies that rank(Λ) =
N − 1, and rank(W ) = 1.
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